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· Do people vote with an eye on 
economic conditions? 
· Does terrorism affect electoral 
outcomes? 
· Are the quantitative effects of 
economic conditions and terrorism 
on vote shares of similar magnitude? 
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Summary:  Within  EUSECON,  one  research  sub-
project  investigates  the  relationship  between 
economic  downturns,  terrorism  and  electoral 
outcomes.  The  analysis  is  carried  out  using  data 
from Spain. Recent Spanish democratic history has 
witnessed  four  complete  economic  cycles,  with 
deep  recessions  and  pronounced  booms.  During 
this period, there has been a nationalistic conflict 
with  terrorist  manifestation.  This  research  uses 
Spanish provincial data from the ten congressional 
elections since the end of Franco's dictatorship. It 
has  been  found  that  changes  in  unemployment, 
inflation  and  terrorism  significantly  influence 










The  available  empirical  evidence  indicates  that 
electoral outcomes are related to economic conditions. 
More  specifically,  economic  downturns  punish 
incumbents as they are held responsible for economic 
adversity (see Fair 2009, Lewis-Beck 1986 and Pacek 
1994). 
Economic  issues  and  electoral  outcomes  have  been 
extensively  analyzed  in  the  political  business  cycle 
models (e.g. Nordhaus 1975). These models  assume 
voters  dislike  inflation  and  unemployment  and  they 
vote in favor of the incumbent (opposition) party if the 
economy  experiences  low  (high)  inflation  and 
unemployment.  Therefore,  the  vote  share  of  the 
incumbent party should be decreasing in past inflation 
and unemployment. 
According  to  Hibbs  (1977),  members  of  left-wing 
parties are more concerned with unemployment and 
less  concerned  with  inflation,  whereas  members  of 
right-wing parties have opposite preferences. Voters 
have different preferences and vote for the right or left 
wing parties accordingly. Therefore we expect to see 
an increase in the right-wing vote share after a period 
of high inflation and an increase in the left-wing vote 
share after a period of high unemployment. 
Terrorism  has  also  been  considered  a  factor  that 
influences  election  results.  Berrebi  and  Klor  (2006, 
2008)  have  proved  that  terrorism  affects  electoral 
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Economic downturns punish incumbents as they 
are held responsible for economic adversity 
activity  in  Israel  increases  right-wing  support  in 
subsequent elections. 
If voters dislike terrorism and identify a party as more 
likely to implement strong anti-terrorism policies, we 
should observe an increase in that party's vote share 
after  a  period  of  high  terrorism  activity,  despite 
whether that party was the incumbent or not. 
In  related  work,  Gassebner,  Jong-A-Pin  and  Mierau 
(2008,  2010)  provide  evidence  indicating  that 
terrorism increases the probability that the incumbent 
government is replaced and reduces cabinet duration. 
The Spanish case 
In  our  study,  we  focused  on  the  response  of  vote 
shares  to  economic  fluctuations 
and  terrorist  conflict.  Spain 
seems to be the ideal niche for a 
study  like  this  since  it  has 
experienced  both  phenomena 
intensively  during  the  last  decades.  Recent  Spanish 
democratic  history  has  witnessed  four  complete 
economic  cycles,  with  deep  recessions  and 
pronounced booms. During this period, there has been 
a nationalistic conflict with terrorist manifestation. To 
give  an  idea  of  how  important  economic  conditions 
and  terrorist  activity  are  for  Spaniards  we  rely  on 
survey data from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas  (CIS).  Figure  1  shows  the  perception  of 
the Spanish people about what they see as the most 
important problems in Spain during the last decade. 
Individuals surveyed are asked to select from a list the 
three most important problems in Spain. Each colored 
line in Figure 1 shows the percentage of people who 
selected  a  given  problem  as  one  of  the  three  most 
important.  The  main  feature  of  these  data  is  that 
unemployment  and  terrorism  are  the  two  most 
important issues in most surveys. It also indicates that 
the importance of terrorism appears to be decreasing, 
in parallel with the number of terrorist assassinations 
during this period. 
The March 11th attacks 
In the case of Spain, the importance of terrorism in 
shaping  people's  political  preferences  has  been  the 
core of a hot debate. The March 11th terrorist attacks 
in  Madrid  took  place  three  days  before  general 
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The 2004 Madrid train bombings resulted in an 
electoral swing which punished the incumbent 
elections.  Before  the  attacks,  from  January  24th  to 
February 15th, CIS surveyed 24,109 people of which 
42.2  per  cent  declared  they  would  vote  for  Partido 
Popular  while  35.5  per  cent  would  vote  for  Partido 
Socialista. Not surprisingly, many analysts argued that 
the  terrorist  attacks  favored  Partido  Socialista  in 
winning the elections, e.g. van Biezen (2005) and Rose 
and Murphy (2007). Garcia-Montalvo (2006) pointed 
out  that  Spanish  non-residents  voted  before  the 
attacks took place and therefore could be used as a 
control  group.  This  coincidence  allowed  him  to 
analyze  a  natural  experiment  by  comparing  vote 
shares  of  resident  and  non-resident  voters.  García-
Montalvo results suggest that there is a causal effect of 
the  March  11th  terrorist  attacks  in  Madrid  and  the 
outcome  of  the  election.  Evidence  in  the  same 
direction was also provided by Bali (2007) who used 
survey data to establish the link between the attacks 
and the election results. 
ETA terrorism and Spanish elections 
Al-Qaeda  March  11th  attacks  were  the  bloodiest 
terrorist  attack  in  Spanish  history,  with  195  people 
murdered.  In  addition  to  those  assassinations,  more 
than 800 terrorist assassinations were perpetrated in 
Spain  during  the  democratic  period,  most  of  which 
correspond to Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). We use 
the  temporal  and  spatial  variation  in  all  the  other 
terrorist  assassinations  to  establish  a  causal  link 
between terrorism and vote shares. 
This research package uses a fractional probit model 
(Papke and Wooldridge 2008) to estimate vote shares 
equations using a panel of the fifty Spanish provinces 
(constituencies) during the ten general elections held 
after  Franco's  dictatorship.  The  fractional  probit 
model takes into account the bounded nature of vote 
shares  and  specifies  the  conditional  mean  of  vote 
shares  as  a  nonlinear  function  of  unemployment, 
inflation,  terrorism,  turnout  and  unobserved 
provincial and election effects. We specify conditional 
means of district and election unobserved effects as 
linear functions of covariates. The estimated model is 
used to compute the partial effects of changes in the 
explanatory variables on vote shares at the provincial 
level.  These  partial  effects  are  aggregated  at  the 
national  level  to  obtain  the  National  Partial  Effects 
(NPE), which is the effect on national vote shares of 
changes in covariates. 
Figure 2 shows the change in the incumbent's vote-
share at the national level as a result of a one-standard 
deviation  change  in  the  number  of  terrorist 
assassinations in the province of Bizkaia. This figure 
also  shows  the  number  of  terrorist  assassinations 
measured  on  the  right  scale.  The  effect  is  always 
negative and ranges from 1 per cent, when terrorism 
in Spain was at its peak to 3 per cent in recent years, 
when  terrorism  reached  its 
lowest values.  
A detailed report of this research 
can be found in Gardeazabal (2010). 
Policy recommendations 
As a general rule, terrorism and economic downturns 
punish  incumbent  governments  as  they  are  held 
responsible.  Economic downturns and terrorism have 
a  significant  effect  on  vote  shares.  The  effect  of 
economic  downturns  is  larger  than  the  effect  of 
terrorism. 
Governments  might  be  tempted  to  use  counter-
terrorism  policy  as  electoral  tool.  Therefore,  the 
Figure 2 Effect on national vote share of a one-standard 
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implementation of some strategy-proof mechanism to 
deal with counter-terrorism policy might be advisable. 
To  the  extent  that  results  drawn  here  can  be 
extrapolated elsewhere, low intensity cases should be 
specially monitored as the electoral effect of terrorism 
is larger the lower the intensity of terrorism.  
Credits 
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EUSECON, or ‘A New Agenda for European Security Economics’ is a 
four-year collaborative research project, administered by DIW 
Berlin and funded by the European Commission that analyses the 
causes, dynamics, and long-term effects of both human-induced 
insecurity threats and European security policies. 
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